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Abstract
We are highly tuned to each other’s visual attention. Perceiving the eye or hand movements of
another person can influence the timing of a saccade or the reach of our own. However, the expla-
nation for such spatial orienting in interpersonal contexts remains disputed. Is it due to the social
appearance of the cue—a hand or an eye—or due to its social relevance—a cue that is connected
to another person with attentional and intentional states? We developed an interpersonal version
of the Posner spatial cueing paradigm. Participants saw a cue and detected a target at the same or
a different location, while interacting with an unseen partner. Participants were led to believe that
the cue was either connected to the gaze location of their partner or was generated randomly by a
computer (Experiment 1), and that their partner had higher or lower social rank while engaged in
the same or a different task (Experiment 2). We found that spatial cue-target compatibility effects
were greater when the cue related to a partner’s gaze. This effect was amplified by the partner’s
social rank, but only when participants believed their partner was engaged in the same task. Taken
together, this is strong evidence in support of the idea that spatial orienting is interpersonally
attuned to the social relevance of the cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who
this person is, and what this person is doing—and does not exclusively rely on the social appear-
ance of the cue. Visual attention is not only guided by the physical salience of one’s environment
but also by the mental representation of its social relevance.
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1. Introduction
Our eyes are in constant demand: Turn signals, pointed glances, and flashing banner
ads all clamor for our visual attention. Some of these cues—glances, head turns, pointing
fingers—are generated by other people. Others—warning lights, traffic signals, and sign-
posts—are put there intentionally by other people as a signal. And others still—the bright
plumage of a bird, a dark rain cloud, or paw prints in the mud—are oblivious to our pres-
ence.
Does the visual attention system respond equally to all these cues? Specifically, do we
give special weight to locations or objects in the world that are cued by other people
since they might indicate their mental states or communicative intentions? Further, if spa-
tial orienting is socially attuned, is this a response to the social appearance of the cue
(e.g., facial features or a finger) or a response to its social relevance, the fact that the cue
is connected to another intentional being with her own states of attention?
Here, we address the question of social relevance by spatially cueing participants’
attention while manipulating their beliefs about the social or non-social origins of those
cues. In this way, we are able to investigate how changes in the social relevance of the
cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who that person is, and what that
person is doing—influence spatial orienting. We make use of a robust feature of spatial
attention and place it in a social context that can be experimentally manipulated.
1.1. Social attention
Since the very first eye tracking experiments, it has been shown that people pay
increased attention to the eyes of others (Yarbus, 1965). Moreover, they focus their atten-
tion to where other people are looking (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Humans are
able to use each other’s eye movements to efficiently cooperate and communicate with
each other. For example, attending to the focus of another’s attention can tell us where
reward or danger is lurking in the environment. Indeed, this “social attention” has a key
function in various aspects of social life facilitating interpersonal communication, suc-
cessful cooperation and human interdependence (Klein, Shepherd, & Platt, 2009; Richard-
son & Gobel, 2015; Risko, Richardson, & Kingstone, 2016).
For example, in gaze-cuing paradigms, it has been shown that the visual attention of
others can direct our own attention. In such experiments, participants are typically shown
a centrally presented drawing or picture of a face gazing in a certain direction, and they
are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to targets appearing either congruent with
gaze direction or incongruent (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Despite gaze being non-
predictive of targets, it has repeatedly been shown that reaction times to congruently cued
targets are facilitated (Frischen et al., 2007).
In these experiments on “social attention” (reviewed in Richardson & Gobel, 2015),
participants are usually presented with unambiguous, visibly social cues, such as faces.
So it is not clear whether shifts in attention are triggered by the social appearance of the
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cues or by the belief that the cues are connected to another person. Indeed, while some
researchers found that mental state attributions modulated gaze cueing effects (Nuku &
Bekkering, 2008; Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis,
2010; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, Mu, & M€uller, 2012), others have failed to find the
same (Cole, Smith, & Atkinson, 2015; Quadflieg, Mason, & Macrae, 2004). Thus, the
empirical literature remains inconsistent on the role that beliefs about the social relevance
of gaze cues play in the allocation of visual attention.
Here, we go beyond the previous literature and ask, what are the minimal conditions
for social context to influence visual attention? Most researchers maintain that people use
prior knowledge and current goals to selectively orient their attention to non-social stim-
uli (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992).
So would beliefs about the social origin of stimuli that are non-social in appearance, such
as a dot representing the gaze of another person, suffice to influence basic attention? In
order to answer this question, we turned away from gaze cueing in which a social stimu-
lus, that is, a face, is presented, and we utilized another widely used paradigm in atten-
tion research: spatial orienting.
1.2. Interpersonally attuned spatial orienting
Our central question is whether aspects of basic attention, in this case spatial orienting,
can be influenced by beliefs about the social relevance of a visual cue—whether the cue
is connected to another person, who that person is, and what that person is doing—even
when the stimuli are non-social in nature. In spatial orienting paradigms, participants’
visual attention is cued to one spatial location, and they are subsequently asked to
respond to the same or a different spatial location. A substantial literature shows that peo-
ple are slower to return their attention back to a location that it has previously occupied
(e.g., Dukewich & Klein, 2015; Klein, 2000); this is called the inhibition of return (IOR)
effect (Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985). It is argued that IOR might play an
adaptive role promoting efficient visual search by biasing attention toward novelty and
away from previously attended objects or locations (Klein & MacInnes, 1999).
There are good reasons to think that it would be adaptive for spatial orienting to be
responsive to the social relevance of another person. If it is true that IOR makes search
more efficient for an individual, then it could also make search more efficient for people
working together. Individuals who are engaged in joint action (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006;
Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) or joint perception (Richardson et al., 2012) are
tuned to the cognitive representations and locus of their partner’s attention. Brennan,
Chen, Dickinson, Neider, and Zelinsky (2008), for example, found that two individuals
performing a visual search task were highly efficient when they could see each other’s
gaze location.
Indeed, previous work has documented interpersonally attuned spatial orienting between
two people, in which one participant is slower to reach to locations that were previously
touched by another participant who sat opposite (Welsh et al., 2005). Some see this as
evidence that the participants are representing each other’s actions through a “mirror
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system” (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) that facilitates the imitation of their movements
(Ondobaka, de Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012; Ondobaka,
Newman-Norlund, De Lange, & Bekkering, 2013) and may even respond to the specific
goals of other people (Hayes, Hansen, & Elliott, 2010; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007).
However, it is debated whether such interpersonal spatial orienting effects are really
“social” at all. Other work suggests it is simply the participants’ reaching movements that
are serving as a visual cue and manipulating their spatial orienting, much as any other
stimulus would (Atkinson, Simpson, Skarratt, & Cole, 2014; Cole, Skarratt, & Billing,
2012; Doneva, Atkinson, Skarratt, & Cole, 2015; Skarratt, Cole, & Kuhn, 2012). Accord-
ing to this view, spatial orienting between two people can be accounted for by mecha-
nisms that do not require any mental representation of who the other person is and what
she is doing, because it is simply an example of a standard orienting effect where the cue
happens to be a hand.
On the other hand, if spatial orienting between two people is influenced by nuances of
social relevance, then this would be strong evidence for truly interpersonally attuned spa-
tial orienting and for social cognition that can guide visual attention even at basic levels,
when the stimuli are non-social in nature.
1.3. The current research
The purpose of our research is to test whether the social relevance of a visual cue—
whether the cue is connected to another person, who that person is, and what that person
is doing—influences spatial orienting effects. The answer to this question would reveal
the scope of social effects on basic visual attention and contribute to the debate about
whether “reaching social IOR effects” are really social at all. To this end, we developed
an interpersonal version of the spatial cueing paradigm (Posner et al., 1985). The classic
spatial orienting effect is that participants are slower to respond to a target when it
appears in the same location as a preceding cue (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). In
our experiments, pairs of participants were seated in the same room but did not see each
other or interact during the experiment. In fact, none of the stimuli they saw had an
explicit, visible social content. Any difference in participants’ spatial orienting would
show that beliefs about the social relevance of the cue changes how attention is deployed,
regardless of the cue’s appearance.
Experiments 1 tests whether believing that an onscreen cue relates to another person
moderates spatial orienting. Experiment 2 tests whether beliefs about who that other per-
son is and whether that other person is task relevant (engaged in the same or a different
task) moderates interpersonal spatial orienting. In all our experiments, every participant
sees exactly the same visual stimuli. The only thing manipulated is the participant’s belief
about the nature of the interaction with the other person; therefore, any changes in spatial
orienting would provide strong evidence for a truly interpersonally attuned visual system
and social cognition that penetrates basic spatial orienting independent of the social
appearance of the stimulus.
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2. Experiment 1
Our goal is to demonstrate that the social relevance of a cue—whether or not partici-
pants believe it relates to another person—will modulate spatial orienting. We were
inspired by previous research that presented another person as an explicitly social stim-
ulus (e.g., Skarratt, Cole, & Kingstone, 2010; Welsh et al., 2005). Perceiving the
actions of another person can slow responses to a target location in exactly the same
way as a participant’s own reach or gaze shift. In our experiment, however, participants
did not see another person: We simply manipulated their belief about whether a disem-
bodied cue had social relevance, reflecting the gaze position of the interaction partner,
or not.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Here, and in the subsequent experiment, we estimated sample sizes based on previous
research on interpersonal IOR, showing moderate to large effect sizes, and targeted to
sample at least 45 subjects in each experiment in order to have 80% power for detection
of a medium-sized effect when employing the traditional 0.05 criterion for statistical sig-
nificance. Ethical approval for all experiments was provided by the UCL Experimental
Psychology department.
Sixty-three participants volunteered to participate in exchange for payment and per-
formed the experiment with a confederate. The confederate was one of four undergradu-
ate research assistants (2 female and 2 male), which were randomly assigned to
participants, so that none of the observed effects would be due to any specific identity of
the confederate. 14 participants were excluded because they were suspicious about the
identity of the confederate or failed to complete the task. Thus, we analyzed data from
49 participants (29 females, Mage = 26.12, SDage = 8.51).
2.1.2. Design
We employed a 2 (Target Location: cued vs. uncued) 9 2 (Cue Origin: human-gener-
ated vs. computer-generated) 9 2 (Background Pictures: present vs. absent) mixed-factor
design, where the dependent variable was participants’ reaction times to the onset of the
target stimulus. Because the participants’ gender did not moderate the effects reported
below, it was not included as factor in our analyses.
2.1.3. Apparatus
The participant and the confederate arrived at the same time and were then seated in
opposing corners of the experimental 25 m2 room, such that they had their backs to each
other and could not see each other’s screens or actions. We told them to not talk or inter-
act during the experimental task. Participants faced a 19″ LCD screen positioned at a dis-
tance of approximately 60 cm. A custom-built remote eye tracker was positioned at the
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base of the screen. The participant and the confederate were both provided with a wire-
less computer mouse to record their responses.
2.1.4. Procedure
We told the participant and the confederate that both of them would see the same set
of pictures (see below for rationale of including pictures) or the same screen with four
white quadrants and a series of geometrical symbols. For both of them, their job was to
respond as quickly as possible to the appearance of a blue square. We explained to both
that eye trackers would monitor their eye movements during the task and that at times
these eye trackers could be connected so that they would see where each other had just
looked at. To bolster the critical manipulation of our study, the participant and the con-
federate were both taken through an eye tracker calibration sequence at the beginning of
the experiment in order to make participants believe that the eye tracker worked, could
be connected, and would show where each other was looking on screen.
We informed the participant and the confederate that throughout the experiment a red
dot would appear, and that half of the times this red dot represented where their partner
had preferentially looked at on their screen (human-generated cue trials), whereas the
other half of times the red dot’s location would be randomly chosen by the computer
(computer-generated cue trials). To signal whether participants were about to engage in
human- or computer-generated cue trials, before the start of every block, a message
appeared on the screen indicating whether the eye trackers were “connected” or “not con-
nected.” The red dot was, of course, always computer-generated. Participants never
received any information from their partner and always carried out the spatial cueing task
independently. The confederate never actively participated in the experiment but
remained silently seated back to back with the participant.
The trial design is shown in Fig. 1. Participants saw a 2 9 2 grid that for half of the par-
ticipants presented for 1,200 ms four pictures taken at random from the IAPS normed data-
base (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005), whereas for the other half of participants the grid
remained empty. To make it plausible as to why the confederate might be looking at one
region rather than another, for half of the participants, we decided to show background pic-
tures on screen. Yet, to remove the possibility that in the social context condition, the par-
ticipants were explicitly imagining what the confederate was thinking while looking at
each picture, we removed the pictures for the second half of participants. In fact, the pres-
ence or absence of background pictures did not change results, as reported below.
Next, a red dot appeared in the same locations of one of the four quadrants for 300 ms
(visual cue). In the human-generated cue condition, participants believed that the cue repre-
sented where the interaction partner had preferentially looked at; and in the computer-gener-
ated cue condition that it was chosen at random by the computer. After the cue disappeared,
a green spinning star appeared centrally for between 300 and 1,200 ms (intervening cue),
followed by a blue square (visual target), which appeared at either the cued or uncued loca-
tion, and participants responded to it as fast as possible. The varying interstimulus interval
was simply used as jitter so that the trial onsets were not predictable, as we had no theoreti-
cal predictions about the potential time course of the effects of social information.
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Participants completed a total of 288 trials during a single session, of which 24 were
catch trials where no blue square was presented. The remaining trials were randomly split
between four SOAs (600 ms, 900 ms, 1,200 ms, 1,500 ms), which fall within the range of
SOAs that have been shown to reliably illicit IOR effects (e.g., Klein, 2000). Twenty-five
percent of all trials were cued trials and 75% of all trials were uncued trials. A testing ses-
sion consisted of four blocks (two social and two non-social), with the order of presenta-
tion counterbalanced across participants. Participants pressed a mouse button with their
dominant (writing) hand as quickly as possible on seeing the blue square (target detection
task). If no response was given after 3,000 ms, the trial ended and the next trial began.
2.2. Results
We analyzed data from trials where cues and targets appeared on screen. We excluded
trials (0.90% of the data) where participants anticipated (RT < 100 ms) or failed to
respond (RT > 3,000 ms). We chose to analyze the data in two complementary ways.
In a first step, we conducted a three-factorial mixed-design Analysis of Variance on
participants’ mean reaction times and entered Background Pictures as a between-subject
factor and Target Location as well as Cue Origin as within-subject factors. This three-
factorial mixed-design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Background Pictures,
F(1, 47) = 10.48, p = .002, g2p = .18, such that participants were overall slower in trials
with background pictures (M = 470 ms, SEM = 15 ms) than when background pictures
were absent (M = 402 ms, SEM = 15 ms), suggesting that an increase in visual informa-
tion increased participants’ response times. We also observed a significant main effect of
Participants believed the 
red cue was generated by 
a computer or by the gaze of 
a human (the confederate)
Confederate was
believed to be doing 
the same task
 
Trial
cue 
300ms
inter-stimulus
interval (ISI) 
300-1200ms
target
(cued location)
target
(uncued location)
Fig. 1. Schema of the Experiment. We asked participants to perform a spatial cueing paradigm with another
person (a confederate). Participants believed that the red cue represented a location chosen at random by the
computer or their partner’s gaze location. The condition with pictures present is depicted here (left); for half
of the participants only an empty grid was shown (right).
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Target Location, with cued trials (M = 445 ms, SEM = 11 ms) slower than uncued trials
(M = 427 ms, SEM = 10 ms), consistent with an overall IOR effect of about 17 ms,
F(1, 47) = 29.97, p < .001, g2p = .39. There was also a main effect of Cue Origin,
F(1, 47) = 15.20, p < .001, g2p = .24, with participants significantly slower overall on
human-generated cue trials (M = 448 ms, SEM = 12 ms) compared to computer-
generated cue trials (M = 424 ms, SEM = 10 ms), suggesting that an increase in social
information increased participants’ response times.
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect between
Target Location and Cue Origin, F(1, 47) = 5.02, p = .03, g2p = .10. In human-generated
cue trials, participants were significantly slower to respond to cued locations
(M = 460 ms, SEM = 13 ms) than uncued locations (M = 437 ms, SEM = 12 ms),
p < .001. This difference was reduced for computer-generated cue trials (Mcued = 430 ms,
SEMcued = 10 ms; and Muncued = 418 ms, SEMuncued = 10 ms, respectively; p = .002). In
other words, the IOR magnitude on human-generated cue trials (M = 23 ms,
SEM = 5 ms) was significantly greater than on computer-generated cue trials
(M = 12 ms, SEM = 4 ms), t(48) = 2.23, p = .03, d = 0.64.
We reran our analyses with SOA as an additional within-subject factor. The four-way
interaction of SOA by background pictures by target location by cue origin did not reach
conventional levels of significance, F(3, 141) < 1, p = .71, g2p = .01, and neither did the
three-way interaction of SOA by target location by cue origin, F(3, 141) = 1.99, p = .12,
g2p = .04, or any other interactions with SOA, Fs < 2. Table 1 shows means and standard
errors across social contexts and different SOA levels.
In a second step, we employed a Bayesian analysis of our results, since in addition to
avoiding some of the problems of null hypothesis significance testing, these analyses are
able to estimate the relative strength of evidence for and against null and alternative
hypotheses (Dienes, 2011; Kruschke, 2010, 2011; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, &
van der Maas, 2011). For each subject, within the human-generated cue and computer-
generated cue conditions, we first calculated the size of the IOR effect by subtracting the
mean RT of uncued trials from the cued trials.
Fig. 2 shows a density plot of these participant IOR effects for the two cue origin con-
ditions. Following Kruschke (2010, 2011, 2013) and using the BEST package for R
Table 1
Mean RTs in ms (with SE) for Experiment 1
Experimental Condition
Human-Generated Computer-Generated
SOA Cued Uncued Cued Uncued
600 ms 484 (16) 476 (14) 464 (12) 444 (11)
900 ms 462 (13) 425 (11) 431 (12) 412 (11)
1,200 ms 450 (15) 422 (12) 421 (13) 415 (11)
1,500 ms 446 (13) 425 (12) 415 (11) 403 (10)
Average 460 (13) 437 (12) 430 (10) 418 (10)
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(Kruschke & Meredith, 2014), we generated posterior probability distributions to compare
the means of the two conditions. The right plot of Fig. 2 shows the distribution of esti-
mates for the difference between conditions. The 95% Bayesian credibility interval,
shown by the gray box, is from 20.6 to 1.3, showing that there is good evidence for a
non-zero difference between the IOR effects in each condition. Importantly, we find con-
verging evidence that believing a non-social cue represents another person’s gaze location
modulates IOR effects.
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 provides initial evidence for the idea that the social relevance of a cue
influences spatial orienting. Manipulating the beliefs about the social origin of non-social
cues alone was sufficient to significantly amplify the IOR magnitude. Since no sensory
characteristics of the stimuli were changed across conditions, IOR differences when the
cue origin was a computer compared to when the cue origin was another human cannot
be attributed to the physical appearance of the stimuli.
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Fig. 2. Red and blue lines show the distribution of inhibition of return effects for each subject in each condi-
tion, with dashed lines indicating the means for each condition. On the right, the gray line shows the poste-
rior probability distributions of the difference between conditions, and the gray area shows the 95%
credibility interval (HDI) for this difference.
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3. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to provide further insight into how the social relevance of another
person impacts interpersonal spatial orienting effects. First, we wanted to understand the
depth of the effects on visual attention: Does it matter who is looking? To answer this
question, we manipulated beliefs about one of the most critical social dimensions: social
hierarchy.
Social hierarchy is one fundamental aspect of social life, structuring interactions in
families, teams, and entire societies (Fiske, 2010). Evolutionary scholars suggest that hier-
archies have been important across our history, because they coordinate group members’
actions, from hunting prey to organizing labor, improving the group’s performance over-
all (e.g., King, Johnson, & Van Vugt, 2009; Van Vugt, 2006). The general idea is that
groups award the highest social rank to the individual that they believe to best represent
their interests. By choosing the best candidate to lead, the group should do better overall,
and individual group members would increase their chances of survival and reproduction.
There are many ways in which organizing groups hierarchically can be beneficial. For
example, social hierarchy distributes resources and thereby reduces intragroup conflict
(Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006; Bendersky & Hays, 2012).
Moreover, social hierarchy leads to more efficient decision making (Van Vugt, Hogan, &
Kaiser, 2008), coordinates collective locomotion (Blau, 1964; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;
Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Willer, 2009), and
increases team performance (Anicich, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015; Halevy, Chou, Galinsky,
& Murnighan, 2012; Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, & Galinsky, 2012). In contrast, if there
is no clear hierarchical structure, group performance suffers (Bendersky & Hays, 2012;
Greer, Caruso, & Jehn, 2011; Greer & van Kleef, 2010). Thus, social hierarchy has a key
function in coordinating social living in groups.
One potential mechanism through which behavioral coordination in groups is accom-
plished is the way group members’ visual attention is guided by higher ranked individu-
als. Indeed, past research has shown that both gazing at and gazing with others are
modulated by targets’ social rank. People are more likely to look at higher rather than at
lower ranked individuals (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013), espe-
cially their eyes (Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010), and are more
likely to follow their gaze (Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & Galfano, 2012). Therefore, we
reasoned that whether a person of higher or a person of lower rank was believed to be
gazing with the participant would modulate interpersonal spatial orienting effects, as it
provided critical information about who the interaction partner would be.
Second, we wanted to understand the breadth of the effects on visual attention: Does it
matter what counts as looking “together”? To answer the question, we dissociated two
alternatives: Would changes in spatial orienting occur when two people believed that they
were looking at the same stimuli at the same time or would they also need to believe that
they were doing the same task? Experiment 1 does not allow us to answer this question,
since participants always believed they were doing the same task. Thus, in Experiment 2,
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we manipulated whether participants believed that they were engaged in the same task or
a different task to their interaction partner.
Cognitive scientists have argued for a long time that visual attention holds a key func-
tion in the coordination of interactions between individuals (Clark, 1996). For example,
research in joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006) and joint perception (Richardson et al.,
2012) suggests that when people construe a task as shared, they are influenced by each
other’s cognitive representations. Through eye movements alone, people can actively
communicate intentions to one another and successfully cooperate (Brennan et al., 2008).
Thus, we reasoned that changes in interpersonal spatial orienting would only occur, when
participants believed they were doing the same task as their interaction partner, as it pro-
vided critical information about their social relevance.
In Experiment 2, we asked participants to perform a spatial cueing paradigm when
gazing with a confederate, who was described as either higher or lower in social rank.
Sometimes we told participants they were doing the same task as the confederate but
other times that they were doing a different task as the confederate. We contrasted two
hypotheses accounting for how social rank would influence interpersonal spatial orienting
effects.
The attentional state hypothesis predicts that a higher ranked interaction partner orients
the onlooker’s visual attention automatically, regardless of what the interaction partner is
doing. In contrast, the intentional state hypothesis holds that a higher ranked interaction
partner does not orient visual attention automatically, but only if that person is task rele-
vant. Only when the onlooker shares the same task as a higher ranked interaction partner
would the latter guide the onlooker’s visual attention.
Evidence in support of the attentional state hypothesis will show a modulation of the
spatial cue-target compatibility effects as a function of the interaction partner’s social
rank independent of whether or not participants believe they are doing the same or a dif-
ferent task as their interaction partner. Evidence in support of the intentional state
hypothesis, however, will only show a modulation of the spatial cue-target compatibility
effects as a function of the interaction partner’s social rank when participants believe they
are doing the same task as their interaction partner.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Forty-five first-year undergraduate students (42 females, Mage = 20.64, SDage = 4.29)
volunteered in exchange for partial course credit and performed the experiment with a
female confederate. In this experiment, we relied on the assistance of the same under-
graduate student for the entire data collection. Because the participants’ gender did not
moderate the effects reported below, it was not included as factor in our analyses. All
participants were included in data analysis, as none of them raised suspicion about the
true nature of the confederate.
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3.1.2. Design
We employed a 2 (Partner Rank: higher rank vs. lower rank) 9 2 (Target Location:
cued vs. uncued) 9 2 (Task Type: same vs. different) mixed-factor design, where the for-
mer factor was manipulated between and the latter two factors were manipulated within
subjects. The dependent variable was participants’ reaction time to the onset of the target
stimulus.
3.1.3. Apparatus
The participant and a confederate arrived at the same time and were then seated in
opposing corners of the experimental 25 m2 room, such that they had their backs to each
other and could not see each other’s screens or actions. We told participants to not talk
or interact during the experimental task. The confederate was a female undergraduate stu-
dent, who matched the majority of participants in age, gender, and ethnicity.
3.1.4. Procedure
Participants carried out the interpersonal spatial cueing paradigm as in Experiment 1
along with the confederate. This time, participants were told that the red dot always repre-
sented their partner’s gaze location. We also explained to them that during half of the
experiment they would engage in the same task as their partner, but in the other half of
the experiment, they would engage in two different tasks. In the latter case, one of them
would continue to respond to the blue square, whereas the other one would memorize the
images presented on screen. In reality, participants were always assigned to detect the
blue square, that is, to carry out the spatial cueing task. To signal whether participants
were about to engage in the same or a different task, a message appeared on screen indi-
cating task type before the start of every block. The order in which participants completed
the six experimental blocks (three blocks same task and three blocks different task) was
counterbalanced between participants, such that half of the participants started with three
same task blocks, whereas the other half of participants started with three different task
blocks. The confederate never actively participated in the experiment but remained
silently seated back-to-back with the participant. Participants completed a total of 432
trials, 48 of which were catch trials during which no blue target was presented. The
remaining trials were randomly split between three SOAs (700, 1,100, and 1,500 ms).
3.1.5. Partner rank manipulation
Before participants started the spatial cueing task, we asked them to fill in a brief ques-
tionnaire about themselves, including demographic information. We also told participants
that they would see some of their partner’s answers. Participants were randomly allocated
to a higher or lower ranked partner condition. In the higher ranked partner condition, par-
ticipants read that the interaction partner attended a top-tier university and came from a
very affluent family with parents having prestigious occupations. In the lower ranked
partner condition, participants read that their interaction partner attended a bottom-tier
university and came from a less affluent family with parents having less prestigious occu-
pations.
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3.1.6. Manipulation check
After participants had completed the spatial cueing task, we asked them to fill in
another brief questionnaire. This time, we were interested in their impressions of their
interaction partner. Among various filler items, we included the following three items
assessing partner’s perceived social rank: “My partner has high social status.” “My part-
ner occupies high social rank.” “My partner has higher social status than me.” Partici-
pants indicated their agreement with these statements along a 7-point scale ranging from
“1 = strongly disagree” to “7 = strongly agree.”
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Perceived social rank
Our social rank manipulation was successful. Since the three perceived social rank
items were highly correlated a = .91, we computed a perceived partner rank score
(M = 4.72, SD = 1.13). We submitted this score to an independent-samples t test. As
expected, confederates in the high-rank condition (N = 24) were perceived to be higher
in social rank than confederates in the low-rank condition (N = 21) (M = 5.36,
SD = 1.05, and M = 3.98, SD = 0.70, respectively), t(40.22) = 5.25, p < .001, d = 1.55.
(We corrected degrees of freedom to account for unequal variance between groups.)
3.2.2. Spatial orienting effects
As before, data from trials where cues and targets appeared on screen were analyzed.
We excluded trials (1.14% of the data) where participants anticipated (RT < 100 ms) or
failed to respond (RT > 3,000 ms).
First, we conducted a three-factorial mixed-design Analysis of Variance on partici-
pants’ mean reaction times, and we entered Partner Rank as a between-subject factor and
Target Location as well as Task Type as within-subject factors. We then followed up
with Bayesian statistics on the IOR effect for each participant in each condition by sub-
tracting the reaction times to uncued trials from cued trials and generating posterior prob-
ability distributions for the estimates of condition differences. Across both analyses and
consistent with the intentional state hypothesis, we found that IOR effects were signifi-
cantly larger when participants interacted with higher compared to lower ranked confed-
erates, but only if participants believed they were engaged in the same task as the
confederate. Since SOA did not interact with our variables of interest, we did not include
SOA as factor in subsequent analyses. Mean RTs and standard errors for all experimental
conditions and across levels of SOA are presented in Table 2.
First, results from the ANOVA indicated a significant effect of Target Location. Partici-
pants were generally slower to respond to cued locations (M = 466 ms, SEM = 15 ms)
than uncued locations (M = 443 ms, SEM = 14 ms), corresponding to an overall IOR
effect of about 23 ms, F(1, 43) = 59.96, p < .001, g2p = .582. We also observed a signifi-
cant two-way interaction between Partner Rank and Target Location, F(1, 43) = 7.78,
p = .008, g2p = .153. Importantly, this two-way interaction was further qualified by Task
Type, as indicated by a significant three-way interaction between Partner Rank, Target
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Location and Task Type, F(1, 43) = 5.64, p = .022, g2p = .116. To further interpret this
three-way-interaction, we investigated participants’ IOR effects as a function of their part-
ners’ social rank separately when they believed they were engaged in the same or a dif-
ferent task. Fig. 3 plots the size of the IOR effects for each of the experimental
conditions, with 95% credibility intervals for the Bayesian estimation of the differences
between high- and low-status conditions.
When engaged in the same task as the interaction partner, the social rank of the inter-
action partner moderated IOR effects, as indicated by a significant two-way interaction
between Partner Rank and Target Location, F(1, 43) = 11.84, p = .001, g2p = .216. When
interacting with a higher ranked interaction partner, participants were significantly slower
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Fig. 3. Purple and green lines show the distribution of inhibition of return effects in each social rank condi-
tion, across the two task conditions with dashed lines indicating the means for each social rank condition.
On the right of each task condition, the gray line shows the Bayesian posterior probability distributions for
the difference between conditions, and the gray area shows the 95% credibility interval (HDI) for this
difference.
Table 2
Mean RTs in ms (with SE) for Experiment 2
Rank
Task
Same Task Different Task
SOA Cued Uncued Cued Uncued
Lower rank partner 700 ms 509 (30) 494 (25) 502 (21) 487 (21)
1,100 ms 456 (21) 450 (23) 479 (24) 452 (20)
1,500 ms 452 (28) 438 (22) 451 (21) 447 (19)
Average 472 (24) 460 (23) 479 (21) 461 (19)
Higher rank partner 700 ms 494 (28) 438 (24) 476 (19) 448 (19)
1,100 ms 448 (19) 418 (22) 431 (22) 421 (19)
1,500 ms 460 (27) 424 (20) 432 (19) 416 (17)
Average 469 (23) 426 (21) 446 (19) 427 (18)
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to respond to cued locations (M = 469 ms, SEM = 23 ms) than uncued locations
(M = 426 ms, SEM = 21 ms), p < .001. However, when interacting with a lower ranked
interaction partner, this was less the case (Mcued = 472 ms, SEMcued = 24 ms; and
Muncued = 460 ms, SEMuncued = 23 ms, respectively; p = .045). IOR effects amounted to
M = 43 ms (SEM = 7 ms) when the interaction partner was higher in social rank, com-
pared to M = 11 ms (SEM = 5 ms) when the interaction partner was lower in social
rank. An independent-samples t test indicated that this difference was highly significant, t
(40.37) = 3.53, p = .001, d = 1.11 (correcting degrees of freedom to account for unequal
variance between groups).
In contrast, when engaged in a different task as the interaction partner, the social rank
of the interaction partner did not moderate IOR effects, F(1, 43) < 1, p = .904,
g2p = .000. When interacting with a higher ranked interaction partner, participants were
slower to respond to cued locations (M = 446 ms, SEM = 19 ms) than uncued locations
(M = 427 ms, SEM = 18 ms), p = .005. And this was also the case when interacting
with a lower ranked interaction partner, (Mcued = 479 ms, SEMcued = 21 ms; and
Muncued = 461 ms, SEMuncued = 19 ms, respectively; p = .003). IOR effects were of simi-
lar magnitude, t(43) < 1, p = .904, d = .04, when the interaction partner was higher in
social rank, M = 19 ms (SEM = 6 ms), compared to when the interaction partner was
lower in social rank, M = 18 ms (SEM = 5 ms).
Another way to interpret the observed three-way interaction is to assess the effect of
being engaged in the same or a different task for higher and lower ranked interaction
partner separately. We found that for higher ranked interaction partner, task type moder-
ated IOR effects, as indicated by a significant target location by task type interaction,
F(1, 23) = 6.13, p = .021, g2p = .210. Thus, IOR effects were almost twice as large when
being engaged in the same task as the higher ranked interaction partner (M = 43 ms;
SEM = 7 ms), compared to when engaged in a different task as the higher ranked interac-
tion partner (M = 19 ms; SEM = 5 ms), t(23) = 2.48, p = .021. In stark contrast, for
lower ranked interaction partners, task type did not moderate IOR effects, F(1, 20) < 1,
p = .426, g2p = .032. Here, IOR effects were of similar magnitude when being engaged
in the same task as the lower ranked interaction partner (M = 11 ms; SEM = 5 ms), com-
pared to when being engaged in a different task as the lower ranked interaction partner
(M = 18 ms; SEM = 5 ms), t(20) < 1, p = .426.
Consistent with the frequentist inference, and as shown in Fig. 3, the distribution of
effects and credibility intervals for the differences between partner rank conditions pro-
vide strong evidence for a non-zero difference between the IOR effects in the same task
but not in the different task condition: When participants believed they were engaged in
the same task as the interaction partner, the 95% Bayesian credibility interval, shown by
the gray box, was from 9.5 to 47.1, demonstrating good evidence for a non-zero differ-
ence between the IOR effects of higher and lower ranking conditions. In contrast, when
engaged in a different task as the interaction partner, the 95% Bayesian credibility inter-
vals included zero (95% CI: 14.1 to 15.7), showing no difference between the IOR
effects as a function of partner rank condition.
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3.2.3. Comparing results from Experiments 1 and 2
If manipulating the beliefs about the social relevance of non-social cues alone can
modulate the magnitude of spatial orienting effects, whether it is because the cue is con-
nected to the interaction partner as in Experiment 1, or whether it is because participants
interacted with a higher ranked interaction partner on the same task as in Experiment 2,
the absence of social relevance should yield comparable spatial orienting effects, as they
reflect the non-social nature of the stimuli when being responded to in the presence of
another person. Therefore, we reasoned that spatial orienting effects in trials where partic-
ipants believed eye trackers to be disconnected in Experiment 1 and in trials where par-
ticipants believed they were working on a different task as their interaction partner in
Experiment 2, the spatial orienting effects should be comparable. To test this prediction,
we compared the computer-generated cue trials from Experiment 1 and the different task
trials from Experiment 2 in a 2 (Experiment: Exp 1 vs. Exp 2) 9 2 (Target Location:
cued vs. uncued) mixed-model ANOVA with the first factor between subjects and the latter
factor within subjects.
We observed that participants responded with an approximately similar speed in Exper-
iment 1 (M = 425 ms, SEM = 12 ms) and Experiment 2 (M = 452 ms, SEM = 12 ms),
F(1, 92) = 2.49, p = .118, g2p = .03. Moreover, we observed a significant main effect of
Target Location, with cued trials (M = 446 ms, SEM = 9 ms) slower than uncued trials
(M = 431 ms, SEM = 8 ms), consistent with an overall IOR effect of about 15 ms,
F(1, 92) = 31.05, p < .001, g2p = .25. Importantly, this effect was comparable in both
experiments, as we did not observe a significant interaction between Experiment and Tar-
get Location, F(1, 92) = 1.51, p = .22, g2p = .02. Thus, in the absence of any social rele-
vance of the cue, either because the cue was computer-generated or because the
interaction partner was engaged in a different task, we observed spatial orienting of
roughly the same magnitude.
3.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2, we found that participants took significantly longer to respond to spa-
tial locations that they believed a higher ranked interaction partner had just looked at, but
not to spatial locations that they believed a lower ranked interaction partner had just
looked at. Importantly, this was only the case when being engaged in the same task but
not when being engaged in a different task as the interaction partner. Experiment 2 also
showed that when interacting with a lower ranked interaction partner, IOR effects
remained similar in magnitude independent of task type, as if the lower ranked interaction
partner was irrelevant to the task at hand. In contrast, when interacting with a higher
ranked interaction partner, the magnitude of IOR effects doubled in size when being
engaged in the same task.
Simply being in the presence of the higher or lower ranked interaction partner who
happened to be looking at the same stimuli at the same time was insufficient to modulate
interpersonal spatial orienting. In fact, the magnitude of the spatial orienting effects in
this condition was roughly the same as when the cue was computer-generated in
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Experiment 1. Thus, only if participants were made to believe that they shared the same
goals and intentions as the interaction partner did the specifics of who the interaction
partner was then matter for the modulation of interpersonal spatial orienting. This finding
is inconsistent with the attentional state hypothesis, and it provides evidence in support
of the intentional state hypothesis. Therein, Experiment 2 adds additional support for the
idea that beliefs about the social relevance of a non-social cue modulate interpersonal
spatial orienting effects.
4. General discussion
Beliefs about the social relevance of a non-social cue influence interpersonal spatial
orienting, independent of the social appearance of the cue. Specifically, our research
yielded three important findings: First, Experiment 1 showed that a non-social red dot
representing the gaze location of an interaction partner amplified spatial cue-target com-
patibility effects compared to when the cue was computer-generated.
Second, Experiment 2 showed that this effect was further modulated by beliefs about
who the interaction partner was and what the interaction partner was doing. Only when
participants believed that they were doing the same task as their interaction partner, and
thus the latter became relevant to the participant, did higher compared to lower ranked
interaction partner yield stronger interpersonal spatial cue-target compatibility effects.
Third, Experiment 2 in combination with results from Experiment 1 also showed that
the mere presence of another person did not suffice to change spatial orienting. Indeed,
results from Experiment 2 rule out the possibility that merely being able to see where the
interaction partner is looking on their screen would be sufficient to modulate spatial atten-
tion. Attributing attentional states without also attributing intentional states did not change
interpersonal spatial orienting effects in our studies.
Taken together, we show that the social relevance of a non-social cue, representing
who another person is and what this other person is doing, modulates interpersonal spatial
cue-target compatibility effects. Importantly, in all our experiments we employed identi-
cal non-social stimuli, and the only thing we manipulated were participants’ beliefs about
the social context.
Our results make two important contributions to our understanding of how visual atten-
tion unfolds within social contexts. They suggest that social cues can have a stronger
effect upon spatial orienting than non-social cues. They also show that these differences
in orienting effects do not depend on social appearance of the cue alone, but they can be
the result of social beliefs instead. In this way, a red dot that looks like any other non-
social stimulus can have a more significant influence on visual attention when participants
believe that it is connected to another person. We believe this is strong evidence for the
“social” nature of the interpersonal spatial orienting effect debated in the literature.
Our findings also have important implications for research on human memory and
social learning. Initial evidence from the joint attention literature suggests that stimuli
that are attended to along with another person are faster and more accurately identified in
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signal detection tasks (Shteynberg, 2010), and they are more likely to be recalled subse-
quently (Eskenazi, Doerrfeld, Logan, & Knoblich, 2013). Moreover, under conditions of
joint attention, participants are also more likely to mimic the behavior of others, one
important form of social learning (Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013). Our research can add
to this literature suggesting that the social relevance of another person, who this person is
and what this person is doing, might further moderate the effect of joint attention on
human memory and social learning.
4.1. The fourth wall of cognitive science
The attentional focus of another person can act as a strong cue for our own attention,
as elegantly demonstrated in the gaze cueing literature (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998;
Frischen et al., 2007). Someone else’s eye and hand movements can even trigger our
own IOR mechanisms (Skarratt et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005). But in all of these
experimental demonstrations, the social cue is visibly social: a face, a hand, or a head
turn. And in each case, researchers have shown that the attentional effect of a social cue
is roughly equivalent to a non-social cue such as an arrow. Here, we showed for the first
time that minimal changes of participants’ beliefs about the social nature of a non-social
cue suffice to increase social over non-social spatial orienting effects.
Our findings highlight the importance of social beliefs on visual attention converging
with similar results from the gaze cueing literature. For example, gaze cueing effects are
modulated by participants’ beliefs about the person cueing their attention (Dalmaso et al.,
2012). Another study found that attributing intentional states to non-social robots, when
participants believed that robots were controlled by human agents, mirrored the cueing
effects seen when participants viewed the face of another human being (Wiese et al.,
2012). Differences in beliefs can even shape habitual ways of attending to others, as
demonstrated by recent research that demonstrated cultural differences in gaze cueing
(Cohen, Sasaki, German, & Kim, 2015).
Our results converge with other recent theory and research making this same point:
Social context has a pervasive effect on visual attention (Richardson & Gobel, 2015). For
example, research has repeatedly shown that visual attention measured in the laboratory
can differ from visual attention as it is employed in the real world (Kuhn, Teszka, Tenaw,
& Kingstone, 2016; Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012; Risko et al.,
2016). When people look at others’ faces, gaze patterns vary significantly depending on
when looking at a live or pre-recorded video (Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn, & Kingstone,
2011), or whether the face is looking directly at them or not (Gobel, Chen, & Richardson,
2017). Indeed, people are very much aware of social scripts that govern when it is
appropriate to look and when it is not (Foulsham, Walker, & Kingstone, 2011; Laidlaw,
Rothwell, & Kingstone, 2016; Wu, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2013).
For example, Gobel, Kim, and Richardson (2015) had participants look at videos of
faces starring into the camera, while they themselves were being videotaped. For half of
the participants, the people in the videoclips were described as higher in social rank,
whereas for the other half of participants they were described as lower in social rank.
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Further, in half the trials, participants were told that the people in the videoclips were
previous participants who would return to the lab in order to view their video recordings
—creating the illusion of the faces on screen looking back at participants. In half the tri-
als, participants were told that the video recordings would not be reviewed—creating the
illusion of them looking at the faces without the latter looking back. Results showed that
participants looked longer to the eyes of higher than lower ranked target faces, but only
if the faces were believed to not look back at them (Gobel et al., 2015). This suggests
that when looking directly at someone, the effects of social rank on visual attention also
depend upon higher order beliefs about the social situation.
4.2. Limitations and future research
We will end with a note of caution. The underlying mechanisms of IOR are still
debated (Dukewich & Klein, 2015; Klein, 2000). While some researchers have argued
that IOR affects information processing at earlier attentional stages (e.g., Posner et al.,
1985; Prime & Ward, 2004), others have argued that IOR affects information processing
at later stages, when decisions are selected (e.g., Prinzmetal, Taylor, Myers, & Nguyen-
Espino, 2011; Taylor & Klein, 1998). While it is beyond the scope of the current
research, future studies could use our current methodology along with neuroscientific
measures to pinpoint the stages of information processing that are influenced by IOR, as
well as the underlying mechanisms of such socially tuned IOR effects.
One possibility is that top–down processes, such as volitional control or stimulus-asso-
ciated reward (e.g., Bucker & Theeuwes, 2014; Lupia~nez, Weaver, Tipper, Madrid, &
Castillo, 2001; Tipper & Kingstone, 2005), might explain our findings. For example,
associating a stimulus with a previously learned reward captures attention (Anderson,
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011), and it improves target discrimination (Maclean & Giesbrecht,
2015). Importantly, in our study, we found that higher compared to lower ranked interac-
tion partners only had a differential effect on interpersonal spatial orienting, when being
task relevant. This may suggest that the social relevance of a cue operates at least in part
differently to its monetary reward. It remains an intriguing question for future research
whether the social relevance of a cue or the monetary value of a cue relies on the same
or different mental representations and neural circuitry.
Another possibility is that changes in arousal might account for our findings. For
example, the mere presence of another person reduces Stroop interference effects
(Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999), and social comparison with a better per-
forming co-actor improves performance on illusionary conjunctions (Muller, Atzeni, &
Butera, 2004). One explanation for these findings is that completing a task with another
person increases arousal, which leads to more cognitive resources being consumed, and
as a result reduces attentional focus to peripheral stimuli (Muller & Butera, 2007;
Normand, Bouquet, & Croizet, 2014). Although it is difficult to imagine how such a
mechanism would result in larger IOR effects in the present set of experiments, increased
levels of arousal as one possible mechanism for why the social relevance of a cue
influences spatial orienting remains an interesting avenue for future studies.
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One important limitation of our experiments is that we presented 25% cued compared
to 75% uncued trials. Previous research has shown that under these circumstances, partic-
ipants are able to learn that targets are less likely to occur in cued compared to uncued
spatial locations (e.g., Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). As a consequence, they may
have been slower to respond to cued compared to uncued spatial locations, because they
develop counter-predictive expectations over time. However, recent research using a 50%
predictive cue replicated the findings reported here (Gobel, Bullock, Kim, Richardson, &
Giesbrecht, unpublished data). While we acknowledge that our data do not allow us to
rule out this possibility, we do believe that it is unlikely that the predictability of the cue
is the only mechanism explaining our findings. All participants saw exactly the same
non-social cues, and the only thing that we manipulated across experimental conditions
was the participant’s belief about the social relevance of the cue.
Another important question that our research raises is whether the effect of social rele-
vance on spatial orienting is limited to volitional eye movements or whether it can also
occur within more reflexive spatial orienting. Previous research differentiates between
two attentional systems implicated in IOR. While one system orients attention to the cued
location, the other disengages and reorients attention away from the cued location to the
behaviorally relevant stimulus (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Indeed, it seems that these
systems rely on distinct functional networks (Kincade, Abrams, Astafiev, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2005; Thiel, Zilles, & Fink, 2004). A recent study found that monetary reward
modulated later stage disengaging and reorienting aspects of spatial attention, but not the
early occurring orienting aspects (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2014). Beyond the scope of the
present research, it would be fascinating to observe that the social relevance of a cue
influences spatial orienting as early as 50–100 ms after stimulus onset. At the same time,
if social representations fail to impact these early occurring aspects of spatial orienting,
this would illustrate an important boundary condition to their effect. It remains an intrigu-
ing question for future research to describe the time course and specific mechanisms
underlying the here observed social relevance effects.
Finally, the present results demonstrate that minimal social contexts influence one
aspect of visual attention: spatial orienting. Future research is needed to test the influence
that the social relevance of a cue might yield onto other attentional processes than IOR.
In the present research, we made a first contribution to the attentional literature showing
that one basic attentional process—spatial orienting—is modulated by beliefs about the
social relevance of the cue—whether the cue is connected to another person, who this
person is, and what this person is doing.
5. Conclusion
People actively follow the attentional focus of others. Our results reveal a new aspect
of employing visual attention in social situations. Even minimal and artificial social con-
texts created in a laboratory—manipulating participants’ beliefs about a non-social cue
representing another person’s gaze—were enough to influence spatial orienting of the
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participant. This basic process of visual attention was further modulated by beliefs about
the social relevance of the other person such as its social rank and its intentional state.
Visual attention is not only guided by the physical salience of one’s environment but also
by the mental representation of its social relevance.
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